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ABSTRACT 
An earlier position paper has examined the applicability of belief-functions 
methodology in three reasoning tasks: (1) representation f incomplete knowledge, 
(2) belief-updating, and (3) evidence pooling. My conclusions were that the use of 
belief unctions encounters basic difficulties along all three tasks, and that exten- 
sive experimental nd theoretical studies should be undertaken before belief 
functions could be applied safely. This article responds to the discussion, in this 
issue, of my conclusions and the degree to which they affect the applicability of 
belief unctions in automated reasoning tasks. 
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1. GENERAL COMMENTS 
I was happy to find most discussants in agreement with the basic conclusion 
of my analysis: "To  use belief functions (BF) and Dempster's rule blindly can 
be very dangerous indeed (Smets, Sm.13). 1 I was also gratified to find most 
responses, especially the insightful analysis of Nic Wilson, helpful in defining 
sharper boundaries between the safe and the dangerous applications of belief 
functions. Naturally, we have many points of disagreement. Some discussants 
1 References tothe articles appearing inthis issue will use the author(s) initial(s) (with Sm for 
Smets and Sh for Shafer), followed by a section umber. References to my position paper [Int. J. 
Approx. Reasoning 4(5/6),363-389, 1990] will be given using the letter P, followed by a section 
number, e.g., P.4. 
This work was supported inpart by National Science Foundation Grant $RI-88-21444 and the 
State of California MICRO 90-127. 
International Journal of  Approximate Reasoning 1992; 6:425-443 
© 1992 Elsevier Science Publishing Co., Inc. 
655 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10010 0888-613X/92/$05.00 425 
426 Judea Pearl 
have expounded philosophies unrelated to the issues raised in my paper; some 
have labored to show that other models of uncertainty (e.g., Bayesian analysis 
and upper and lower probabilities) suffer from similar or other weaknesses. I 
cannot address these topics here, as it would take us beyond the scope of this 
arena; neither will I attempt to answer every critical point mentioned by the 
discussants. Rather, I will focus on the central issue of this discussion, the role 
of belief functions in reasoning systems, and I will try to assess to what degree 
the discussants' replies affect he conclusions of my earlier analysis. 
2. SEMANTICAL ISSUES AND PROBABILITIES OF PROVABILITY 
In P.2, I described the metaphor of "probability of provability," which, to 
me, has been a constant source of insight into the properties and capabilities of 
belief functions (Pearl [1]). I slightly expanded this model in [2], where belief 
functions are described as conclusions drawn from randomly sampled assump- 
tions. The probability-of-provability model turned out to be useful to many 
researchers. Laskey and Lehner [3] used it to augment ATMS with numerical 
measures of uncertainty. Greg Provan used ATMS to compute belief functions 
(Provan [4]) and has offered a comprehensive treatment of the relation between 
belief functions and propositional logic (Provan [5]). Nic Wilson [6] has 
developed Monte Carlo methods for calculating belief functions from such a 
model and has outlined ways of extending probability analysis to nonproposi- 
tional logics (see also Pearl [1], sec. 9.2.3). In summary, although some 
readers may find alternative metaphors more comfortable, I believe that 
probabilities of provability will continue to serve AI researchers as the 
canonical model for understanding belief functions. 
Smets, on the other hand, denying all linkages to probability models (Sm.2), 
also denies what seems to be the only linkage belief function analysis maintains 
to experiential reality. The loss of this linkage from Smets's philosophy is 
regrettable, as it could have shed valuable light on many of his arguments, 
valid and invalid alike. It could have served to understand, as I will show in 
subsequent sections, why certain limitations of belief function theory are basic 
while others are curable. 
Ruspini, Lowrance, and Strat endorse the usefulness of the probability-of- 
provability interpretation (RLS.2), and point out correctly the formal equiva- 
lence of this interpretation to Ruspini's epistemic probability. They maintain, 
however, that probabilities of provability, as opposed to probabilities of truth, 
are the "best"  information that is available to the analyst, with which I cannot 
agree. As demonstrated in my Examples 1, 2, and 3 (P.2.1), analysts usually 
possess valuable knowledge that is simply not expressible as probabilities of 
provability. This includes partial probability assignment to subsets of variables, 
qualitative information of dependence and independence, and judgments about 
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the relative magnitudes of probabilities. Belief functions are not sufficiently 
expressive for encoding and using this extra knowledge, and, hence, more 
powerful anguages must often be invoked. 
I must also take issue with the contention of Ruspini et al. (RLS.2) that we 
can only measure the probability that the evidence implies A, rather than the 
probability that A is true, given the evidence. When it comes to measure- 
ments, I believe it is probabilities of truth that we measure (approximately), 
while probabilities of implications are metareasoning constructs derived from 
two levels of abstraction, one consisting of a logical theory (or a "compatibil- 
ity relation") and one that randomly imposes axioms on that theory (Pearl [1], 
pp. 423-427). Such constructs require the intervention of a human analyst o 
provide the logical theories; hence they can hardly be called "measurable," 
not even approximately. 
Provan questions the utility of attaching a declarative semantics to belief 
functions and proposes, instead, to examine their procedural semantics in the 
form of systems of conflicting arguments. I believe any concrete work in this 
direction will be very useful, especially now, when argument-based systems 
are gaining respectability in AI. At the same time, we should be cautious in 
appealing to procedural semantics to rescue the semantical difficulties found in 
the BF formulation. For example, I find little comfort in Provan's promise that 
" i f  indeed the means of obtaining results is important, then Dempster-Shafer 
theory will be correct for some of the cases for which Pearl shows it is 
incorrect." Such cases, if any are found, should be carefully analyzed to 
ensure that the incorrectness can be safely contained. 
Most discussants agree with my position that belief functions do not repre- 
sent "probabilistic ignorance by an interval of possible values." On the other 
hand, Ruspini et al. (RLS.2) and Dubois and Prade (DP.2) view belief 
functions as a computationally efficient ool for approximating manipulations 
on probability intervals. This may be a new promising role for belief functions, 
and it would be interesting to determine when the gain in simplicity would 
justify the loss in precision. The vanishing interval in the three prisoners 
example (see Section 7) illustrates that the loss in precision might occasionally 
become detrimental. Thus, I tend to agree with Shafer's conclusion that the 
family of probability distributions that are bounded by belief functions "is a 
purely mathematical construct, with no conceptional significance" (Sh.4.2). 
Shafer's uneasiness with probability of provability, "because it gives the 
impression that compatibility relations are always permanent" (Sh.4.3), evokes 
two comments. First, I do not see why anyone will get an impression of 
permanence when the proofs under discussion are always predicated upon the 
evidence actually observed. In the case of Betty the witness (Sh.4.1), for 
example, we do not go through life trying to establish a proof for "a tree fell 
on my car" by sampling witnesses from Betty's reference class. Rather, we try 
to establish such a proof given Betty's specific testimony and using one of two 
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randomly drawn assumptions: that Betty is reliable, or that she is not. The 
establishment of such a proof, admittedly, is not a random event whose 
frequency can be determined by direct measurement unless we have a large 
pool of witnesses haring Betty's testimony and reliability rating. It is neverthe- 
less a bona fide random event whose frequency can be determined analytically 
from that of another andom event: Betty's reliability. 
Second, the distinction between permanent and transitory compatibility 
relations has not, to the best of my knowledge, been required before in the 
literature on belief functions. It seems to me that in order to rescue Dempster's 
rule from the difficulties of the three prisoners puzzle (see Section 7) Shafer is 
introducing a new and dangerous twist into the theory, one that would take 
belief functions farther away from practical applications. 
Shafer considers this distinction to be crucial. In his words, " In order to 
compare this with the conditions for Dempster's rule . . . .  we have to interpret 
the multivalued mappings as transitory or permanent compatibility relations" 
(Sh.4.7), or, " I t  will certainly not be appropriate to combine a group of belief 
functions by Dempster's rule if more than one of them is based on a permanent 
compatibility relation" (Sh.4.5). Thus, the entire methodology of belief func- 
tions seems to hinge on this test for transitoriness of compatibility relations, a 
concept hat I find hard to define and hard to test in practice. 
I f  by a transitory compatibility relation we mean one that is sensitive to the 
content of the evidence reported, not merely to the properties of the evidence 
source, then most of my examples, including the three prisoners story, do 
induce transitory compatibility relations. If, however, transitoriness means 
sensitivity to samples drawn at random from the available probability distribu- 
tions, then it is very easy to incorporate such sensitivity in my examples. For 
instance, we can imagine that the guard in the three prisoners story is only 
partly honest, which would make the compatibility between "the guard named 
B"  and "B  will be executed" a random relation, as desired by transitoriness. 
Yet this type of transitoriness will not rectify the paradoxical behavior of belief 
functions in the three prisoners problem. If, as a third possibility, a transitory 
relation must be one that lacks any permanent component whatsoever, then I 
submit that such relations are either nonexistent or extremely rare. Even the 
simple case of Betty (the witness with uncertain reliability, Sh.4.1) contains a 
permanent component: The outcome "unreliable" remains compatible with 
"tree fell on my car" regardless of what Betty says, and the evidence "Betty 
says a tree fell on my car" remains compatible with "a  tree actually fell on my 
car" regardless of whether Betty is reliable or not. 
How, then, are we to distinguish between permanent and transitory compati- 
bility relations, a distinction that Shafer considers crucial? 
In Sh.4.7 (last paragraph) we find a clue for yet another interpretation of 
"permanence." Here Shafer connects permanence with additivity--each of the 
three prisoners has an a priori 1/3 chance of being executed, as if "the victim 
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is chosen at random." I fail to see how the method by which the victim is 
chosen has anything to do with compatibility, which is a relation between the 
identity of the victims and the identity of whoever is named by the guard. 
Would the compatibility relation turn transitory if the additivity of the belief 
function were not the result of a random choice but, say, of obtaining three 
incriminating items of evidence, one for each prisoner? If so, this would 
legitimize the applicability of Dempster's rule, and lead to the same paradoxi- 
cal behavior as before. 
I invite Glenn to provide us a precise test for permanence, one that forbids 
the application of Dempster's rule in the three prisoners puzzle yet does not 
exclude the use of belief functions in practical reasoning systems. 
3. ON DECISION SUPPORT 
All discussants have acknowledged problems in using BF analysis as a guide 
to decision making, and most agree that such a guide should exhibit more of 
the properties of additive probability functions. The question remains how to 
construct such functions from states of incomplete information. 
Smets tells us about a pigmistic transformation that takes a belief function 
and maps it into an additive probability function (Sm.1). An alternative 
approach would be to convert belief functions into likelihood functions, and 
combine them with reasonably assessed prior probabilities (P.4). What is not 
clear in both approaches i  whether it is worth carrying belief functions in their 
full glorious details, given that eventually they must be converted to additive 
functions. A convincing demonstration is needed to show that these details are 
crucial and cannot be approximated away by likelihood functions. A second 
question is whether decisions based on the pigmistic transformation would 
carry any guarantees of good behavior. We know, for example, that they are 
not guarded from violating the sure-thing principle (see Section 9), or from 
acting strangely in the three prisoners story (Section 7). It is important 
therefore to explicate what doctrines of rationality such decisions are expected 
to uphold. 
Ruspini, Lowrance, and Strat (RLS.3) advocate the translation of belief 
functions into utility intervals. This invites problems similar to those of the 
pigmistic transformation: If BF analysis is capable of producing overly narrow 
probability intervals, it will also produce overly narrow utility intervals. 
Moreover, having failed to find a meaningful interpretation to the probability 
intervals produced by the BF analysis, I see no reason why utility intervals will 
fare any better and why the intervals computed by Ruspini et al. have anything 
to do with "intervals of possible utility values." Ruspini et al. maintain that 
the paradoxical intervals produced in problems such as the three prisoners 
story (Section 7) reflect a misuse of BF theory and can be cured by more 
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sophisticated handling of dependent evidence. As I explain in Section 7, the 
problem has nothing to do with dependent evidence. Rather, it stems from the 
basic nature of belief functions as probabilities of provability, which Ruspini et 
al. accept. Therefore, my concern remains that the poorly understood "utility 
intervals" in the RLS analysis might lead to strange, if not harmful, decisions, 
unacceptable even to BF analysts. 
4. LIKELIHOOD FUNCTIONS AS SUBSTITUTE FOR BELIEF 
FUNCTIONS 
I was somewhat disappointed by the lack of response to my proposal to use 
belief functions as a means of translating subjective probability assessments to
likelihood functions (P.4). Provan, for example, portraying me as "antiplura- 
list" fanatic, has failed to notice my earnest and concrete attempt to follow his 
objective of seeking what he calls "the form of uncertainty best modeled by 
Dempster-Shafer theory." Dubois and Prade (DP.8) were busy tracing the 
historical origins of Eq. (22) (P.4) and are fascinated by its mathematical 
similarities with operations in possibility theory. Consequently, they too have 
failed to answer my basic question: What is lost by the transformation defined 
in Eq. (22), and, if not much is lost, is this a reasonable use for belief 
functions? 
Smets (Sm. 13) dismisses my proposal as "not so enlightening" (compared 
with the "more interesting" relations he once found to possibility theory) but, 
again, stops short of telling us why it is not useful. I believe that the 
applicability of belief functions deserves to be judged, not by their mathemati- 
cal interest but by a down-to-earth analysis of compatibility. 
5. EXPERIMENTS WITH INCOMPLETE KNOWLEDGE BASES 
My second source of disappointment is connected with the response of BF 
practitioners. In (P.5) I raised the hopes that experimental studies will be 
undertaken to assess how vulnerable BF systems are to the weaknesses 
identified in my paper. I have hoped that researchers having extensive xperi- 
ence with such systems will shed some light on this question. 
Indeed, Ruspini et al. (RLS.6) report difficulties with the "manipulation of 
conditional and dependent evidence," which they attribute to "evidential 
combination falling outside the scope of its representational capabilities." 
Strangely, they deny any relation between these difficulties and those identified 
in my paper, and insist on directing the blame at what they call the "more 
worrisome methodological limitation" of BF theory, one that they hope to 
overcome by devising new extensions to the theory. I do not wish to quibble 
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with Ruspini et al. over the correct diagnosis of the difficulties observed in 
their experiments; I would simply invite them to make these observations 
public and let the readers judge whether the symptoms observed are basically 
different from those predicted in my analysis--the cures will emerge eventu- 
ally. 
6. REPRESENTING GENERIC KNOWLEDGE AND CONDIT IONAL 
SENTENCES 
Some of the respondents agree with my position that incomplete domain 
knowledge cannot be adequately represented by a single belief function (P.5). 
Dubois and Prade (DP.2) make an interesting suggestion that belief functions 
may still be used to approximate such knowledge. They analyze the feasibility 
of treating rules as constraints over a privileged set of belief functions and 
show that, contrary to my first concern regarding such treatment (P.5), if-then 
rules are indeed better behaved than those encoded as single belief functions. 
These results are very encouraging, but they bring to mind my second concern 
regarding the treatment of rules as constraints on belief functions: Will the 
abandonment of Dempster's rule result in overly cumbersome computations? 
Smets dismisses difficulties of encoding domain knowledge as problems of 
"poorly known probabilities" (Sm.2), a relic from the province of upper and 
lower probabilities that belief functions are not mandated to handle. In his 
words: " I  developed the TBM as a model totally unlinked to any underlying 
probability model just to avoid any such criticism." In other words, belief 
functions are exempt a priori from properly expressing any information to 
which one can find some probabilistic interpretation, and this, I am afraid, 
would include the bulk of human knowledge. Smets's position is convenient 
but also dangerous, because, as we have seen through several examples (P.2.2, 
P.3.1), maintaining some linkage to underlying probability models, even when 
such do not seem to "exist, ' '2 often protects us from forgetting common sense 
altogether. It is important to recognize that the partial information reflected in 
these examples (which comprise qualitative information about independence 
relations and ignorance about dependencies) is an important component in 
human reasoning regardless of whether one postulates "the existence" or "the 
nonexistence" of probabilities. 
In Sm.10, Smets attempts to resolve the difficulties associated with condi- 
tional sentences using the special predicates "typical birds" (TB) and "non- 
21 am not aware that probabilities can literally "exist"; for me, probabilities are merely 
conceptual constructs that one chooses to reason with, not physical objects to be given existence 
tests. See Section 8for elaboration. 
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typical birds" (NTB),  which are similar to McCarthy's abnormality (ab) 
predicate. Had he taken seriously the semantics of  probabilities of provability, 
much of this effort could have been saved, because this semantics predicts that 
all the problems encountered in the logical approaches to default reasoning are 
bound to surface in Smets's or any other BF approach to default reasoning, as 
long as rules are treated as individual belief functions. This was shown more 
formally by Wilson [7]. 
To exemplify these difficulties, let us examine Smets's solution to the 
Tweety problem. In the default reasoning literature, the added sentence saying 
"penguins are abnormal birds" is called a cancellation axiom. This apparatus 
has the following weaknesses: Say we have another default, asserting "Things 
that look like penguins are penguins," written LP  ~ P. We would naturally 
wish to conclude that if Tim looks like a penguin then Tim is a penguin, and so 
he does not fly. Unfortunately, the cancellation axiom cure now leads to 
undesirable ffects; not only can we not conclude that Tim does not fly, we 
cannot even conclude that Tim is a penguin. 3 The reason is that the a priori 
high mass given to typical birds (TB) tends to deplete (through the contraposi- 
tive form of P ~ NTB)  the mass given to P by LP  and LP  ---' p4  
Wilson (W.5) takes the position that "bel ief functions do represent a very 
natural form of "incomplete knowledge." Following Shafer [9], he identifies 
the circumstances when this form will become natural as "when we have a 
probability function on a space fl and wish to extend this via a compatibility 
relation to another space O. "  Unfortunately, the three prisoners story (see 
Section 7) teaches us that merely wishing to extend a probability function over 
a compatibility relation does not make the extension atural. 
Wilson then goes to great length to illustrate that default rules interpreted as 
standard belief functions have some desirable properties, properties not shared 
by conditional probability interpretations of defaults unless fortified by inde- 
pendence assumptions. 5 This is to be expected because, by encoding rules as 
randomized material implications, we invite all the power of standard mono- 
tonic logic, including chaining, contraposition, and irrelevant information 
(W.5.3), and we compromise on specificity and reasoning by cases. Indeed, 
the conditional and implicational approaches represent wo extreme points of 
the spectrum. However, although substantial progress has been achieved in 
3 The ills of cancellation axioms were pointed out to me by Hector Geffner and were conveyed 
to Smets and Hsia in my review of their paper (Smets and Hsia [8]). I was therefore surprised to 
read Smets's tatement, "The paradox then disappears." 
4 This is the same contraposition problem that Smets dismisses so lightly at the end of Section 
10. 
5 Wilson (W.5.3) admits that it is easier to incorporate such independence assumptions (or 
conventions) in the lower probability approach than with the BF approach, where they are 
inflexibly constrained byDempster's rule. 
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going from the conditional toward the implicational (see, e.q., Geffner [10], 
Goldszmidt et al. [11], Goldszmidt and Pearl [12], very little progress is 
reported in the opposite direction, that is, equipping implication-based systems 
with features that properly handle specificity and reasoning by cases. 
Glenn Sharer objects to the very distinction between "knowledge" and 
"evidence," apparently because such distinction, if authenticated, would legit- 
imize the asymmetry that Bayesians perceive between old evidence (which 
determines prior and conditional probabilities) and new evidence (on which we 
condition). Glenn goes so far as to endow me with a credit I do not deserve: 
the creation of the philosophical vocabulary that distinguishes "knowledge" 
from "evidence." The fact is, this distinction has been recognized by many 
philosophers before. The need to separate necessary from incidental relations, 
or background from contingent knowledge, had been the primary motivation 
behind the development of modal logics and possible-worlds semantics. Neces- 
sary relations, like the tendency of birds to fly, are attributed to all possible 
worlds, while the flying ability exhibited by a given observed group of birds 
(as well as Glenn being in Maine and wearing a white shirt) is attributed to our 
particular world. 
In fact, the knowledge-vs.-evidence distinction is manifested so clearly in 
our language that one hardly needs philosophers to document its legitimacy. 
The word if, for example, always marks a relation that belongs to one's 
background knowledge; it never connects pecific observations. It appears that 
" i f "  serves to warn the listener that a sentence such as " i f  Fido is a dog then 
Fido barks" conveys general knowledge about dogs--it should not be mistaken 
for an observational fact (to be phrased "Fido is not a nonbarking dog") and 
should not, therefore, be used to condition one's state of knowledge upon. 
The most glaring manifestation of the separation between knowledge and 
evidence can be found in the use of counterfactuals. For example, believing 
that "all blocks on this table are green" does not entitle us to conclude that 
"had this blue block been on this table it would have been green." At the same 
time, believing that "all boxes painted in this shop are green" does entitle us 
to conclude "had this blue box been painted in this shop it would have been 
green." To me, the fact that we uniformly agree on which counterfactuals are 
legitimate means that we uniformly agree on what constitutes a "tendency of 
things to happen" as opposed to "things that actually happened." And if we 
agree on this distinction, I should not feel too guilty for defining "knowledge" 
and "evidence" the way I did in my paper, even if I were the first to do so 
(which is counterfactual). 
I do not claim, of course, that the distinction between old evidence and new 
evidence is "handed to us by Nature" (Sh.2.3). What I do claim is that the 
human race has found it useful to summarize and organize some of the old 
evidence in a special way and to elevate these summaries to a special status 
called "knowledge," a status unshared by new observations. I also claim that, 
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in order to be compatible with human-style reasoning, theories of evidence 
must take into account his peculiar organization of the mind and, accordingly, 
must accommodate the distinction between knowledge and evidence. 
7. THE THREE PRISONERS PROBLEM 
In the three prisoners problem (P.3.1), 6 the discussants are divided into two 
groups, the first approving of the BF result of Bel(A) = 1/2, the second 
attempting to modify it within the BF framework. Smets accepts the increase of 
belief from Bel(A 0 = 1/3 to Bel(A l) = 1/2 as perfectly reasonable, appar- 
ently because in his analysis Bel(x) can be interpreted as the probability that x 
occurs "whatever Mother Nature (however hostile) will do" (see Sm.7.1), and 
this most hostile strategy occurs when the guard is determined to avoid naming 
prisoner 3 whenever possible. 
Dubois and Prade, too, find nothing strange in the answer P(A 0 = 1/2. 
They consult a "purely logical" analysis (DP.6) and find that the information 
provided by the guard warrants an increase of belief from 1/3 to 1/2. After 
all, so the argument goes, prisoner 1 started with three equally likely possibili- 
ties and ended up with only two, so "Why would prisoner 1 conclude that 
prisoner 3 has twice as many chances as himself to be executed given that the 
guard said prisoner 2 was to be saved?" 
What both Smets and Dubois and Prade fail to notice is that the remaining 
possibilities are no longer equally likely. Prisoner 3, unlike 1, couM have 
been named by the jailer, and the fact that he was not named renders him 
suspect of being "unnamable," that is, the one who will be executed. To 
convince the reader that such an argument should play a central role in 
plausible reasoning, consider the 1000 jailers version of the three prisoners 
story, as I used in [13] and [1, revised second printing, Exercise 9.5, p. 466]. 
Imagine prisoner 1 repeating the experiment with 1000 different jailers, none 
knowing about the others, and all naming 2 as one who will be released. 
Intuitively, such a strange coincidence should call for some explanation as to 
why 3 was not named by any of the jailers, strongly suggesting that he was not 
in fact available for naming, being the victim himself. This, then, is the reason 
that prisoner 1 should conclude that prisoner 3 has a much greater chance than 
himself to be executed. 
This commonsense consideration cannot be brushed off as a by-product of 
6 For the sake of uniformity, I will use the same notation as in P.3.1; that is, one of three 
prisoners 1, 2, 3 is to be executed; A i stands for the event hat prisoner i is the unfortunate one; 
and the jailer (or guard) named prisoner 2 as one who is to be released. The strategy by which the 
jailer selects names (in case there is a choice) is not  known [see P.3.1, Eq.(15)]. 
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one's "postulating the existence" of an additive probabilistic function (Sm.2); 
they are an integral part of human intuition, and if postulating the existence of 
probability models is our only way of capturing this intuition, then it is 
certainly an exercise worth pursuing. This intuition is not reflected in the 
"purely logical" approach advocated by Smets and Dubois and Prade, in 
which there will always remain two possibilities (either 1 or 3 will be 
executed) regardless of how many jailers are involved. Those committed to the 
use of belief functions in reasoning systems must then find other ways of 
embracing this intuition within the formalism. 
Superficially, the BF analysis may seem to adapt the explanation that 
prisoner 3 was not named because ach and every jailer (without colluding 
with the other) was determined to avoid naming 3 whenever possible, as if BF 
analysis is always concerned with Nature's most hostile strategy, as suggested 
by Smets (Sm.7.1). However, if Nature's most hostile strategy ields Bel(x) 
= 1/2, then, presumably, Nature's "most benevolent" strategy should be 
used in calculating Bel(~x) = 1 - Pl(x). But, alas, the "most benevolent" 
strategy consists of the jailers conspiring to name prisoner 2 whenever 
possible, and this strategy ields P(A1) = 0, not P(A 1) = 1/2 as in the BF 
analysis. In fact, the BF analysis does not concern itself with strategies at all; 
the result BeI(AI) = 1/2 is a direct product of invoking the unusual notion of 
probability of provability (instead of probability of truth) in problems of 
diagnosis (see P. 1 and Pearl [2]). 
Ruspini, Lowrance, and Stratt present a totally new defense for the three 
prisoners tory (RLS.5.1). They simply claim that Dempster's rule of updating 
is inapplicable in this case because the jailer's answer is not independent of the 
process by which guilt and innocence was decided. This suggests a refreshing 
new requirement of evidence independence that unfortunately, would limit the 
application of Dempster's rule to trivial cases where it is hardly needed. 
For an item of evidence to be of any value, it must depend in some way on 
the state of nature for which it is an evidence (e.g., the identity of the victim in 
the three prisoners tory). Moreover, if we have several items of evidence, 
each depending on the state of nature, these items of evidence should also 
depend on each other. This kind of dependency is not a nuisance but a 
necessary bliss; no evidential reasoning would otherwise be possible. This is 
precisely the kind of dependency that Dempster's rule was designed to handle 
(see Shafer's random code example). Thus, I do not see the point in the effort 
of Ruspini et al. " to extend the original theory to produce and utilize 
conditional belief information that incorporates known dependencies between 
evidential bodies." If this statement means that one should refrain from using 
Dempster's rule (and BF analysis?) until their extension is completed, then 
Ruspini et al. have a much more pessimistic view of the applicability of belief 
functions than that expressed in my paper. 
Glenn Shafer, too, takes the position that Dempster's rule cannot be applied 
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to the three prisoners problem, albeit for a different reason: the compatibility 
relation being nontransitory. I have questioned the viability of the "transitori- 
ness" criterion in Section 2; here I will only comment on Shafer's treatment of 
"protocols." 
Contrary to Shafer, I doubt that the three prisoners tory has ever been a 
serious puzzle for Bayesians. It might have served as a curious riddle for 
testing theory against unaided intuition, but not as a puzzle that threatens to 
undermine the foundations of the theory. Deeply entrenched in the Bayesian 
analysis is the principle that we should condition only on the evidence actually 
observed, not on conclusions derived from observations. For this reason, 
Bayesians never deny the need to consider what Shafer calls a "protocol," 
namely, the method by which the evidence was obtained. On the contrary, 
Bayesians consider protocols to be useful tools for interpreting and assessing 
the impact of evidence, not a constraining nuisance as suggested by Shafer's 
analysis. 
Indeed, any theory of evidence that is insensitive to protocols is destined to 
clash with common intuition. The 1000 guards variant of the three prisoners 
story (third paragraph, this section) illustrates this point quite clearly. Here we 
have a situation where the bare evidence is identical to that of the original story 
(namely, prisoner 2 is sure to be released) but the protocol is different: 1000 
guards (instead of one) now point to prisoner 2, and none points to prisoner 3. 
Surely, human intuition dictates that evidence obtained under these circum- 
stances hould have a significantly different impact on the fate of prisoner 1 
than that obtained in the original story. We expect such a difference in impact 
to prevail even in cases where we have no idea how the guard(s) would choose 
between naming 2 and naming 3. Yet any theory that attempts to ignore 
protocols, belief functions included, will remain oblivious to these intuitive 
demands. I thus wonder: How many guards are needed before we acknowledge 
that protocol analysis is inevitable and that merely assuming any reasonable 
protocol (or several reasonable ones) is better than pretending that a protocol 
does not exist? 
8. HOW DOES JUDEA PEARL INTERPRET PROBABILITY? (SH.2.7) 
Shafer disapproves of the way I have been avoiding the historical debates 
concerning the frequency-vs.-belief interpretation of probability (Sh.2.7). My 
position on the relevance of these debates to AI is expounded elsewhere 
(Shafer and Pearl [14], pp. 341-343). Briefly, I always interpret probabilities 
to mean degrees of belief, and I attribute their conformity with the calculus of 
frequency (in most judgmental tasks, not only in gambling situations) to their 
being summaries of mental experience, and mental experience is rich with 
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frequencies. In this section, I would like to stress the similarity of my 
interpretation of probability to Shafer's general idea of constructivism. 
In my mind, "a  willingness to talk about the probability of something 
without asking whether there is such a probability" (Sh.2.7), a strategy I 
called "model completion" in Shafer and Pearl [14], lies at the very heart of 
constructivism. To me, constructivism eans that we do not stop to question 
whether an object still exists each time we turn our head; rather, we construct a
convenient coherent picture of the world assuming that the object remains 
intact throughout the head-turning experience. In the physical sciences, con- 
structivism permits us to imagine that fields exist even in a vacuum, where 
there are no particles to attest o their presence. It means that when we fail to 
estimate the mass of an object, we do not suddenly question whether it has 
mass in the first place. Drawing the analogy closer to home, constructivism 
means that the practice and benefits of consulting probability models when we 
have enough evidence to construct hem do not stop abruptly just because we 
happened to miss a measurement, an argument, or a reference class; they 
simply require constructive ways of compensating for the missing information. 
Shafer claims that his constructive theory of belief functions is "a  way of 
making some probability judgments without creating so many fictional proba- 
bilities that speculation about them swamps what little evidence we have." I 
believe the few examples in my paper show that this overly cautious strategy 
often produces precisely the opposite results: A failure to construct just one or 
two judgments can cause us to abandon or misrepresent valuable information 
that is well grounded in experience, and to totally shift our interest away from 
our original intent. In the three prisoners problem, for example, the BF 
strategy prevents us from expressing the valuable information that our evidence 
suggests that the guard has no reason to prefer naming one prisoner over 
another, or that we strongly believe that the 1000 guards acted independently 
of each other. Additionally, instead of asking for the probability that Art will 
be executed, we are now forced to settle for the probability that his execution 
is inevitable, a question we might not care to ask. 
By contrast, my interpretation views probability as a mental construct hat 
we impose on reality, whose legitimacy lies in the computational nd psycho- 
logical advantages it produces. In the same way that it is legitimate to attribute 
particle-like properties to entities like electrons, holes, quasars, and waves, so 
it is also legitimate to attribute probability-like properties to states of uncer- 
tainty, part of which, admittedly, are convenient extrapolations atbest. 
I believe that the Peter, Paul, and Mary example (P.3.2) demonstrates quite 
clearly what can be gained by pretending that probabilities exist even where 
their existence could be questioned by the zealous philosopher. It demonstrates 
that certain useful information about probabilities, about independence, and 
about causality (see Section 9, paragraph 5) can best be represented as part of a 
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hypothetical probability model, and that this information will be lost if we are 
prevented from constructing such a model. 
To summarize, the advantages of the "model completion" strategy include 
1. Proper utilization of those probabilities that do have evidential basis, 
especially judgments about independence and about causal relationships 
2. A single calculus, facilitating conditionalization, for handling both partial 
and complete probability models 
3. Coherent behavior and protection from paradoxical reasoning patterns 
like those demonstrated in my examples 
4. Indications of where ignorance lies and where information is missing 
5. Sensitivity to protocols and multiple evidence 
9. THE SPOILED SANDWICH EFFECT (P.3.2) 
Smets (Sm.7) launches an all-out effort to show that the sandwich principle 
[perhaps because it hurts the promotion of his Eq. (10)] should not be taken as 
a guiding principle for commonsense r asoning or for decision making. He 
gives several examples in which our intuition should presumably favor the 
spoiling of the sandwich, none of which is really convincing. 
EXAMPLE 1 (WHETHER X IS YOUNG) The weak point in this example is 
premise (5), Be112(Y) < BellM(Y), which I find to be rather questionable. 
Imagine, for the sake of argument, hat our doubt in the full reliability of the 
witnesses W 1 and W 2 originates from the possibility that the person they both 
saw was not really X but X', who is known to be an old woman. Now, from 
testimony E 2 we can logically infer that the person observed was X, not X'. 
So our belief Bel12(Y) is 1. In contrast, learning that X is a male (M) still 
leaves room for suspecting that the person seen was X', not X, so Bel~2 
(Y) > Bel1M(Y ). True, the story does not tell us that X '  is an old woman. 
But not being told about a possibility does not mean we should not account for 
it before rushing into agreement with Smets's premise (5). 
EXAMPLE 2 (WHETHER THE KILLER WILL USE A GUN) Suppose you have 
three potential killers, A, B, and C. I shall select one of them, but you will 
not know how. Each killer selects his weapon by an independent random 
process with P(gun) = 0.2 and P(knife) - 0.8. What is your "belief" that 
the killer will use a gun? The BF solution is Bel(gun) = 0.2 x 0.2 x 0.2 = 
0.008, which Smets attempts to defend. The solution offered by the sandwich 
principle is 0.2, which Smets insists on attacking. 
The reason I repeat here the full description of this example is that it 
demonstrates so vividly what belief functions compute, why these computa- 
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tions yield counterintuitive r sults, and how the sandwich principle can guard 
us against such results. Smets himself notices that not all is right with his 
analysis. He therefore rationalizes the conclusion Bel(gun) = 0.008 by appeal- 
ing to a bizarre selection process, whereby the killer is chosen by a knife-lov- 
ing person after finding out what weapon each candidate is about o use. The 
more sensible result, Bel(gun)= 0.2, is dismissed, as usual, as one that 
applies only in those cases where the killer is chosen by a random device. 
Well, here is a challenge to TBM analysts: Suppose we know with absolute 
certainty that the killer is to be chosen before the weapon is selected and, of 
course (to block the usual escape route), that the choice of the killer is not 
made by a random device but by some undisclosed strategy. Should we still 
accept he result Bel(gun) = 0.008 as measuring our belief that a gun will be 
used? In other words, suppose I happen to disbelieve in premonition and other 
supernatural powers, hence I am totally convinced that it is impossible to 
foretell which weapon will be selected for each killer (by the random process). 
Would the language of belief functions permit me to express this conviction as 
part of my knowledge base, or must TBM users be resigned to having their 
beliefs governed by fears of the unnatural? From Smets's analysis, it appears 
that the latter is the current state of affairs in TBM. 
A similar challenge can be addressed to Smets's treatment of the fat-intelli- 
gent-popular example (Sm. 10) that I used to illustrate why the contrapositive 
form of if-then rules should not be invoked indiscriminately (P.2.3). Smets 
promises us: "The reason these conclusions are unsatisfactory is that there are 
extra constraints we would like to see fulfi l led.., but did not include in our 
initial analysis. Introduce them in the TBM analysis, and the result will be 
satisfactory." Well, here are the extra constraints: Our culture normally 
considers obesity and intelligence to be independent properties of individuals. 
Can we encode this cultural bias within the TBM language? And when we do, 
can the TBM analysis guarantee that Joe would not be branded a moron if he 
were found to be fat? 
Among all respondents, only Wilson has seriously addressed this challenge 
(W.5.2). He observes correctly that the assumption of "exception indepen- 
dence" (similar to that used in noisy OR models) is not appropriate for 
handling conflicting rules, and concludes, therefore, that Dempster's rule, 
which implicitly invokes this assumption, should not be used. Wilson errs in 
one point, though (W.5.2). The Bayesian interpretation f if-then rules never 
appeals to likelihood ratios. Likelihood ratios are reserved for the encoding of 
specific items of evidence, whereas if-then rules are interpreted as conveying 
domain knowledge. Additionally, although it is fairly easy in the Bayesian 
analysis to impose the constraint that two variables (e.g., obesity and intelli- 
gence) remain independent, it is not straightforward to encode this valuable 
piece of information in the BF language. 
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EXAMPLE 3 (KING DAVID AND BATH-SHEBA) Smets seems to be so im- 
mersed in King David's dilemma that he fails to notice my anticipative warning 
that such examples bear no relevance to the acceptability of the sure-thing 
principle, which reads: 
If a person would choose the same action for every possible outcome of 
an experiment, hen he ought o choose that action without running the 
experiment. 
In (P.3.2) I stated: 
While arguments against the universal validity of the sure-thing principle 
have been contrived (see, for example, [Blyth 1972]), these usually involve 
intricate situations where actions influence the outcome of the experiment. I f
we violate the sandwich principle, we are bound to compromise the sure-thing 
principle even in those cases where its validity is clear and compelling. For 
example, a prisoner who prefers to wait patiently for his verdict before asking 
a question would suddenly decide to attempt an escape, regardless of whether 
the jailer answers "B"  or "not B . "  
Smets's version of the King David and Bath-Sheba story (a variant of 
Simpson's paradox) falls precisely into those situations where actions influence 
the outcome of the experiment. Thus, nothing in that story should convince us 
to abandon the sure-thing principle (hence the sandwich principle) in situations 
where the outcome of the experiment is independent of the decision one is 
about to make. 7 The statistical table in the King David story shows B and C 
dependent, as though the kings surveyed id not make their B decisions freely 
but were inhibited by their charismatic standing. Alternatively, this dependence 
might mirror how the kings' charisma (C) was tarnished by their iniquitous 
acts (B). In King David's case, since he is trying to make a free-choice 
decision about Bath-Sheba (B), the table that should be consulted epends on 
whether he believes that C is a cause for B or the other way around. In the 
former case, he should consult the table that fits his charismatic lass; in the 
latter case, he should rely on the population as a whole (Table 3). 
But this story has nothing to do with the sure-thing principle. The principle 
simply claims that if David were contemplating taking a charisma test, and if 
he is determined to act B assuming the test comes up C and act B assuming 
that the test comes up ~C, then he can skip the test altogether and act B 
immediately. The principle does not force David to act one way or the other 
given his charismatic status, nor does it tell David which statistical table should 
be consulted. 
Indeed, no one insists on accepting the sure-thing principle in cases where 
7 The following paragraphs contain excerpts from my February 5, 1990, letter to Smets, in 
which I discussed his King David example. 
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the decision influences the observation. For instance, if I knew for sure 
whether or not you would accept my position, in either case I would go to 
sleep and not bother to build a stronger argument. However, not knowing your 
reaction, I choose to stay awake and try to convince you. This is not a violation 
of the sure-thing principle. On the other hand, a prisoner waiting patiently for 
his verdict before getting the jailer's answer who suddenly decides to escape 
from prison regardless of whether the answer is B or not-B, does violate the 
sure-thing principle. 
Both Wilson (W.4) and Ruspini et al. (RLS.5.2) find comfort in the fact that 
upper and lower probabilities also violate the sandwich principle. This is not 
surprising; lower probabilities are used primarily to indicate where knowledge 
is missing but were not advocated as guides to decision making or as measures 
of degree of belief (see P.3.1, footnote 9). It is worth pointing out, though, 
that upper and lower probabilities do obey a weaker form of the sandwich 
principle: 
min[ P.( A I B),P.( A I~B)] <_ P.( A) 
<_P*(A)<_ max[P*(AIB),P*(AI~B)] 
No such bounds hold for belief functions, as illustrated by the three prisoners 
example. The ramification of this bound is that it is always possible to satisfy 
the sandwich principle by selecting values for P (A) ,  P(AIB), and 
P(AI~B ) from the ranges defined by the upper and lower probabilities. 
Moreover, when these ranges become sufficiently narrow, as is the case in 
e-semantics (Pearl [1]), the sandwich principle is safely restored. 
Wilson (W.4), like Smets, maintains that the sandwich principle cannot be 
regarded as a general principle for plausible reasoning. I can follow Wilson's 
examples relative to measures of support (W.4.1), likelihoods (W.4.2), ran- 
dom probabilities (W.4.3), and lower probabilities (W.4.4), and I agree that 
these measures do not obey the sandwich principle. However, when it comes 
to measures of belief (W.4.5), I must admit to a terrible shortcoming: I cannot 
see how the "Philippe, Pearl, and Mary" example violates the sandwich 
principle nor why it has anything to do with measures of belief. I believe that 
the reader will also find this example hard to follow and less than convincing. 
10. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This brings to mind a rather discouraging thought. I f  the sandwich principle 
is indeed as readily broken as Wilson and Smets would like us to believe, why 
does it take such laborious effort to contrive even one simple and natural 
example that invites a violation of this principle? After all, if belief functions 
were representative of commonly used concepts in human reasoning, we 
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should have been able to collect such examples by just randomly sampling 
sentences from ordinary conversations. The paucity and contrivance of such 
examples uggest that the language of plausible reasoning has not endowed Bel 
and P1 (or lower probabilities) with the status of basic concepts, as it did with 
"degree of belief." 
Let us examine this point more closely via the Peter, Paul and Mary story of 
Example 5 (P.3.2). According to Smets, Peter's credal state of belief in 
winning the 1000 dollars is zero, while his pigmistic belief is 1/2. Yet if we 
were to simply ask a person how strongly he/she believes in winning, the 
answer would be 1/2, not zero. We would need to labor really hard to explain 
to that person what that epistemic onstruct should be that attains a value zero. 
(It is for that reason that I had to use the phrase "a 50% assurance," which 
Ruspini et al. correctly detected as being ill defined, at least formally; the 
English language simply does not have a term corresponding to Smets's 
"credal state of belief.") I therefore doubt that BV theory formalizes an 
"epistemic onstruct " (Sm. 1) as natural as "degree of belief." The closest 
mental construct o a belief function would be "strength of argument" or 
"evidential support," but even these I doubt will receive a measure of zero for 
"winning" and a measure of 1/2 for "heads" in the Peter, Paul, and Mary 
example. What evidence do we then have that people commonly use an 
epistemic onstruct possessing the properties of belief functions? The only 
evidence I found (P.4) is the use of the expression " I  am only 20% sure that 
X"  when we wish to convey evidence in favor of X. But, apparently, my 
suggestion for using belief functions to handle such expressions did not gain 
much support among the discussants. 
Regardless of how my analysis will impact he actual use of belief functions, 
I believe it has served a useful purpose in focusing, clarifying, and organizing 
the issues involved from an automated reasoning standpoint. At the very least, 
I hope it helped define a common vocabulary and canonical examples for 
communicating ew ideas. I thank all discussants for tolerating the bluntness of 
my inquiry and for taking the time to seriously address the issues of my 
concern. 
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